Is Nuclear Deal With U.S -BACK DOOR ENTRY TO NPT??

Indian Nuclear Society News
Vol. 3, No. 3, July – September 2006
The relevant Committees of the two Houses of the US
Congress adopted the Waiver Bills (full text of the bills is
available in Library of congress web site) to enable the US
to conclude a bilateral agreement with India to give effect to
the nuclear deal, many have gone into an overdrive to
convince the people of India that this is the best thing that
ever happened in India’s history, and there is nothing more
for us to do except to stand up and cheer. They have
dismissed the concerns expressed by eminent scientists,
defence analysts and some politicians, as foolish, misguided,
mischievous or at best, born out of complete ignorance The
spokesmen of the government of India, have repeatedly
informed us that the Indo-US nuclear deal is all about nuclear
energy and not at all about non-proliferation. Yet, Section 2
of the Bill adopted by the International Relations Committee
of the House of Representatives begins by stating that,
“Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other
weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them,
and the means to deliver them are critical objectives for US
foreign policy.” After further singing the praises of NPT, the
Committee states, “It is in the interest of the US to the fullest
extent possible to ensure that these countries, that are not
NPT members, are responsible with any nuclear technology
they develop.” The Senate Committee has voiced similar
sentiments. This provision and the other provisions of the
Bills make it amply clear that for the US Congress, the entire
objective of the Indo-US nuclear deal is non-proliferation and
not development of nuclear energy in India. This is a myth
number one.
The Prime Minister had assured Parliament and the
people repeatedly that the separation of our facilities into
civilian and military would be done by us voluntarily, and in
exercise of our sovereign authority. The Prime Minister had
told Parliament on August 4, 2005 that, “It will be an
autonomous Indian decision as to what is civilian and what
is military. Nobody outside will tell us what is civilian and
what is military.” The Prime Minister went back on this
himself when he told Parliament in a suo-motu statement on
February 27, 2006, “At the official level we have constituted
two groups… These two groups were respectively mandated
to draw up an acceptable separation plan and to negotiate
on that basis. The negotiations by our officials have been
extensive and prolonged.” The US undersecretary of state
Nicholas Burns shed more light on this when he said on
March 2, 2006 in New Delhi, “What the Indians did after Prime
THE BILLS – BACK DOOR ENTRY TO NPT
Minister Singh’s visit to the White House in July was to
develop a plan, a very complex plan that would, in effect,
separate its military nuclear facilities and its civilian nuclear
facilities. And we helped the Indians to try to think through
the separation plan, because it has to be presented to the
United States Congress and then it will have to be presented
to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.” The Prime Minister had
assured Parliament on July 29, 2005 that such identification
and separation would be “a phased action” and would be
“based solely on our own duly calibrated national decisions.”
All along it was known that the plan would have to be
“acceptable” to the US and would have to be submitted to
them for approval. Since the Americans were not satisfied
with this plan, a fresh separation plan was prepared and
submitted to the US authorities in February 2006. Thus, far
from being “an autonomous Indian decision,” the separation
plan has been submitted to the Americans time and again
and finalised only after their approval.
Now, this autonomous Indian decision taken “voluntarily”
and “in exercise of our sovereign authority” will have to be
submitted to the US Congress for their scrutiny and approval.
Section 4(c)(2)(A) of the House of Representatives Bill clearly
states that, “A summary of the plan provided to the US and
the IAEA to separate India’s civil and military nuclear facilities,
materials, and programmes, and the declaration made by
India to the IAEA identifying India’s civil facilities to be placed
under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the
credibility of such plan and declaration, together with copies
of the plan and declaration” will have to be submitted by the
US President to the two Committees dealing with foreign
policy of the House and the Senate. Obviously, the two
Committees are not asking for this separation plan to adorn
their library; they are asking for it in order to examine it in
detail before approving it. So much for our sovereign authority
and the voluntary nature of the separation plan! The third
myth that was propagated was that, India would get fuel for
Tarapur immediately, and when the Russians supplied low
enriched uranium (LEU) for Tarapur recently, it was believed
that this was the outcome of the Indo-US nuclear deal. The
fact is that the Russians had agreed to supply LEU for
Tarapur well before July 18, 2005. But what is even more
disconcerting is the fact that despite the commitment in the
July 18, 2005 agreement, that the “United States will work
with friends and allies to adjust international regime to enable
full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India,
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Indian Nuclear Society News
including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel
supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur. In the
meantime, United States will encourage its partners to also
consider this request expeditiously,” the US actually opposed
the supply of fuel for Tarapur by Russia, and the Russians
supplied it in the face of American opposition.
The fourth myth is about the sequencing of the various
steps to give effect to the deal. In his statement to Parliament
on March 7, 2006, the Prime Minister said, “The United
States government has accepted this separation plan. It now
intends to approach the US Congress for amending its laws
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group for adapting its guidelines
to enable full civilian cooperation between India and the
international community. At the appropriate stage, India will
approach the IAEA to discuss and fashion an India specific
safeguards agreement.” He was even more emphatic about
the sequencing of the various steps when at the press
conference with President Bush in New Delhi on March 2,
2006, the Prime Minister said, “An important step forward is
the preparation of a separation plan, which separates the
civilian nuclear programme from the military programme. That
phase has been successfully completed. Now it is for the
US to go to the Congress for necessary amendments in the
US laws, also the US will approach the members of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and thereafter we will also have to
go to IAEA for India specific safeguards.” This sequencing
now stands on its head. The House Bill clearly lays down in
Section 4(b)(1) the following pre-conditions, namely that,
“India has provided the US and the IAEA with a credible plan
to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and
programmes, and has filed a declaration regarding the civil
facilities with IAEA” and “(2) India and the IAEA have
concluded an agreement requiring the application of IAEA
safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards,
principles, and practices…” before the US Congress approves
the agreement with India. Section 4(b)(3) of the Bill goes a
step further and lays down that India and the IAEA should
make “substantial progress towards concluding an additional
protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and
policies that would apply to India’s civil nuclear programme”
as a reporting requirement by the US President. This is not
rhetoric; these are determinations by the US President who,
in his report to the Congress, would have to state that “the
following actions have occurred.” Thus, India will have to
complete its part of the deal, including entering into
irrevocable commitments with an international organisation
like the IAEA, before the US Congress will agree to consider
the bilateral “123 agreement” with India.
The next myth which has been propagated is that this
deal is a de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapon
state and is based on complete parity with such states. In
his July 29, 2005 statement to Parliament, the Prime Minister
had said, “Predicated on our obtaining the same benefits
and advantages as other nuclear powers is the understanding
that we shall undertake the same responsibilities and
obligations as such countries, including the United States.
Concomitantly, we expect the same rights and benefits.”
The PMO in a “backgrounder” issued on July 29, 2005, went
a step further. On the question of flexibility it said, “Nuclear
weapon states, including the US have the right to shift
facilities from civilian category to military and there is no
reason why this should not apply to India. This also
addresses possible concerns on capping.” And again, “India
has accepted responsibilities in a strictly non-discriminatory
manner (i.e. the same as other nuclear weapon states).” And
yet again, “India, in turn, has committed to taking reciprocally
exactly the same steps that other nuclear weapon states
have taken.” The “backgrounder” has repeatedly emphasised
that India will have the same benefits and advantages as
other nuclear weapon states. So, military facilities can
continue to do civilian work.
Subsequent developments have proved beyond doubt
that India is not being recognised as a nuclear weapons state,
it will have the status of only a non-nuclear weapons state.
US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, in her testimony
on April 5, 2006 before the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, had clearly said, “India is not and is not going to
become a member of the NPT (as) a nuclear weapon state.”
In fact, the Prime Minister has acknowledged that India
is accepting international inspections of a type that are
applicable not to nuclear-weapons states, but to non-nuclear
states. The PM told Parliament on March 7, 2006: “India will
place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific
safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate
safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.” Nuclearweapons
states only accept voluntary, revocable safeguards
while perpetual inspections apply solely to non-nuclear
weapon states. This decision is contrary to the Prime
Minister’s assurance in Parliament on July 29, 2005 that
India would “place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards. India will never accept discrimination.
”The two Bills go further. They paint India clearly in a
South Asian corner. In Section 3(b), where the Congress
lays down the policies of the US with respect to South Asia,
the House Bill says that the US will work to “achieve a
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Vol. 3, No. 3, July – September 2006
moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear
explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s
Republic of China at the earliest possible date.” The Senate
Bill mentions only Pakistan and India and not China in this
context. Section 3(b)(5) clearly states that the US policy
with respect to South Asia will be to “seek to halt the increase
of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia and to promote
their reduction and eventual elimination.” In Section 4(c)(D)
the Bill further says that the President shall submit to the
two Committees of the US Congress information on a number
of issues including “a description of the steps that US has
taken and will take to encourage India to identify and declare
a date by which India will be willing to stop production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant
to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.” It will not be an ordinary
report because it will have to include the reasons which form
the basis of the determination by the US President. So much
for India being recognised as a nuclear weapons state; so
much for not accepting discrimination and so much for the
assertion that the deal will have no consequences for our
strategic or weapons programme!
Some of the other features of the two Bills are: The
government of India would, in future, be more accountable
to the US Congress than to the Indian Parliament. On the
various determinations to be submitted by the US President
to the US Congress every year by January 31, India’s nuclear
programme will have to be laid bare including “(i) an estimate
for the previous year of the amount of uranium mined in
India; (ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been
used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive
devices; (iii) the rate of production of – (I) fissile material for
nuclear explosive devices; and (II) nuclear explosive devices;
and (iv) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has
affected such rate of production of nuclear explosive devices.”
In other words, the US Congress will acquire the right to
know how many nuclear weapons India is producing every
year, something which only the Prime Minister of India knows
so far; something which is not even shared with members of
the Cabinet Committee on Security.
Through the various reports which will have to be
submitted to the US Congress by the US President, the US
Congress will not only be privy to detailed information on the
entire range of India’s nuclear programme including its
weapons programme, it will acquire a large number of
pressure points to impose its will on the government of India
through the US President. Thus, while Parliament of India
may not have such a role, the US Congress will acquire the
authority to monitor India’s nuclear programme closely and
at least every year. If this is not obtrusive or invasive, one
wonders what else is. India’s foreign policy henceforth will
have to be in line with US foreign policy objectives. The
Congress has called upon the President to “secure India’s
full and active participation in the US efforts to dissuade,
isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its
efforts to acquire weapons for mass destruction…”
India will have to “actively” work with the US for the
early conclusion of an international Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty. There is no reciprocal obligation on the US to work
with India, otherwise, the US would not have submitted the
draft of a new FMCT to the Committee on Disarmament in
Geneva without including the verification requirement which
has been a consistent Indian position regarding FMCT. In
other words, it means that India will have to support, rightly
or wrongly, all US foreign policy initiatives in future. So much
for the pursuit of an independent foreign policy by this
government!
All the commitments made by India will be in perpetuity
without any exit clause. This is what prompted Homi Sethna
to remark that perhaps we would have been better off signing
the NPT itself. The proponents of the deal counter it by saying
that the reciprocal obligation of the US and members of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group to supply fuel for India’s reactors is
also in perpetuity. It is like comparing apples with oranges.
These countries are not going to make any investments to
supply nuclear fuel to India. On the other hand, India would
have invested billions of dollars in new nuclear reactors which
will be left high and dry if fuel supplies are stopped. And fuel
supplies will be stopped and the deal will be off if India were
to test a nuclear explosive device or violate any of the
provisions of the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. As
far as further nuclear tests are concerned, our voluntary
moratorium not to do so, is now being written in stone in a
bilateral agreement with the US.
Eminent scientists have spoken against this deal. Noted
defence analysts have opposed the deal. In a free vote, I
have no doubt that a majority of the members of Parliament
will vote against the deal. And yet, the government is going
ahead with the deal and is justifying every surrender it is
making to the US as an act of great courage and
statesmanship. Nothing could be more laughable. Nothing
could be more dangerous.
(Information gathered by the Editor)
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